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Since the outset economics has been concerned with what Adam 
Smith called the ‘wealth of nations’ – although today we differentiate more 
clearly between ‘wealth’ and ‘income’ than Smith did.  Economic historians 
in turn seek to explain differences and changes over time in the ‘income of 
nations’.  Explanations are plentiful, and there are many ways too of 
measuring the differences and changes.  Although GDP per head remains 
the most popular measure and the one with the widest geographical and 
chronological reach, anthropometric measures such as body mass index, 
mean adult height, and birth weight, and survey data on life satisfaction 
offer alternative perspectives on wellbeing (compare Easterlin 2003; Offer 
2002; Fogel 2004: 36).2   
The focus of this paper is not on explaining growth, but on the output 
and welfare implications of the different routes from ‘there’ to ‘here’ taken by 
two pairs of economies.  The case studies concern [i] Ireland and Italy 
during the second half of the twentieth century; and [ii] the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands and Great Britain between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  Both case studies concern alternative growth paths involving 
initial divergence or ‘forging ahead’ by one country followed by the other 
catching up. In effect, Italy and Britain describe the counterfactual paths 
  1not taken by Ireland and the Netherlands, respectively.  In the case of 
Ireland and Italy, both economies set out at roughly the same point in terms 
of productivity in mid-century.  Between the 1950s and the 1980s Italy 
forged ahead, only to be caught up by a late surge from Ireland in the 
1990s.  In the Anglo-Dutch case, it was the Netherlands that opened up a 
lead during the Dutch Golden Age (c. 1580-1670) only to be tagged by 
industrializing Britain more than a century later.  The paper is about the 
measurement and some welfare implications of the different paths travelled. 
 
 
1.1. Ireland and Italy 
1987 was the year of much-vaunted il sorpasso, when the aggregate 
output of the Italian economy, albeit briefly, overtook that of Great Britain 
(Maddison 2001: Tables C1-b and C1-c).3  For Ireland 1999, when GDP per 
head overtook that of the United Kingdom, marked a similar defining 
moment.  In 1998 Irish GDP per head also overtook that of Italy.  By the 
mid-2000s Ireland was well ahead of the UK in terms of GDP per head and 
even further ahead of Northern Ireland, traditionally the more developed 
region of the island.  
During the 1990s much was made of the dynamism of the Irish 
economy, and outside observers focused on what the Celtic Tiger might 
teach other economies about rapid growth.  It seemed as if the Irish had just 
unlocked the secret to fast, sustained economic growth.  The celebratory 
commentary on that era from far and near (e.g. Gray 1997), and the 
eagerness elsewhere to learn from Ireland, might seem to imply that the 
  2Celtic Tiger’s growth compensated for the earlier delay: the main thing is 
that Ireland got there eventually.  Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (2000) suggest 
otherwise: they argue that Ireland’s route of under-achievement followed by 
convergence and even overshooting exacted a heavy price in economic 
welfare. 
If a shift in economic policy was a precondition for the economic boom 
that began in the late 1980s and made Ireland ‘Europe’s star-performing 
economy’, by the same token earlier underperformance can be blamed 
largely on policy failure.  Inward-looking economic policies, including tariff 
protection and restrictions on capital imports, were mainly responsible for 
the stagnation of the 1950s.  The opening up of the economy in the late 
1950s yielded results in the following decade, but the gains were negated by 
the disastrous policy response to the second oil crisis of the late 1970s.  
That response sought to match the impact of the price shock through fiscal 
expansion, with the result that public expenditure rose to levels that by the 
early 1980s threatened national bankruptcy.  There followed a period of 
fiscal rectitude and high unemployment. The public debt/GDP ratio peaked 
at 129% in 1986; in that same year the unemployment rate was 18%, and it 
would remain above ten per cent for another decade.   
Between 1987 and 2000 the economy grew at an annual rate of 7%, 
faster than any other OECD economy.  Even today Irish economic growth 
continues to exceed the OECD and EU averages.  This suggests that there is 
more to the achievement of the Irish economy than ‘catch-up’ or belated 
convergence.  However, compensation for underperformance since mid-
century is a crucial part of the story.  Two features of economic growth in 
  3this period support this view.  First, when adjusted for the effects of transfer 
pricing, productivity growth in the 1990s was ‘within the range exhibited by 
other countries and by Ireland itself in earlier periods’ (Honohan and Walsh 
2002: 45-46).  Second, when the spare capacity that had accumulated since 
the early 1980s had been mopped up, the rate of economic growth slowed 
down, although it still remained considerably above the EU average. 
The course of the Irish economy since 1950 – initial under-
performance, mitigated by rapid advance from the late 1980s on – prompts 
an analysis of the last half century or so of Irish economic history as a unit.4  
Although dwarfing Ireland in terms of both population and output5, Italy 
offers a useful comparative perspective, since both economies were 
backward by west European standards in mid-century, with GDPs per head 
barely half those of the United Kingdom, Sweden, or Denmark.6  Of course, 
these two economies differed in obvious ways that conditioned their very 
different trajectories.  In geographic terms, Italy is located in the heart of 
Europe while Ireland is on the periphery.  At the outset Italy benefited from 
generous doses of Marshall Aid and from the stimulus of European 
economic integration.  Ireland’s gains from European integration and foreign 
largesse would come toward the end of the century, at a time when the 
tyranny of distance mattered much less than in mid-century.   
In the 1950s and 1960s real Irish GDP per head fell way behind 
Italian; the gap narrowed thereafter, but it took the hectic growth of the 
Celtic Tiger era to bridge it once more.  The contrasting growth paths of the 
two economies are described in Tables 1 and 2 and in Figures 1 and 2.  In 
Italy GDP per head grew steadily until near the end of the period, while the 
  4rate of growth of population fell from 0.6% in the 1950s and 1960s to close 
to zero today.  In Ireland, the rate of GDP growth per head accelerated over 
the half century, even during the years of gloom and doom in the 1980s. 
Short-run movements in the two economies were poorly correlated: while 
the 1950s are deemed Ireland’s ‘lost decade’, in Italy they were years of 
‘economic miracle’, and while Italy was enjoying its ‘splendid eighties’, 
Ireland was digging its way out of a deep economic crisis.7  Short-term 
population movements differed too.  While Italian population growth 
decelerated over the half-century, Irish population growth was subject to 
wide fluctuations.  The half-century included two stretches of decline when 
emigration was substantial and a time in the late 1960s and 1970s when 
population grew by over one per cent annually.   
Imagine for a moment that statistical artefact, the average citizen, 
faced with the choice of either the Italian or Irish route to affluence in 1950.  
The cumulative difference in income (which we take to be a proxy for 
consumption) to 1998 – i.e. the value of the wedge in Figure 1 – is 42 times 
Irish 1950 GDP per head or eight times 1998 GDP per head.  Alternatively, 
had Ireland followed the Italian road, Irish GDP per head would have been 
forty per cent higher on average in the interim.  Discounting forward at two 
per cent gives ratios of 24 times Irish 1950 GDP per head and 4.6 times 
1998 GDP per head, and discounting forward at three per cent gives ones of 
19 and 3.6.  Discounting or no discounting, the cost of slower growth in the 
early phases was clearly ‘big’. 
  Whether discounting is appropriate here is rather a moot point.  
Discounting is equivalent to treating all those who lived in the country for 
  5part or whole of the period in question as if they were represented by a lone 
individual with no thought for the next generation and with ‘no family or 
friends interested in his (her) survival’ (Williamson 1984: 158).  Whatever 
about the validity of such an analogy for periods of a few decades, the 
historical record usually refers to longer spells, necessarily involving 
successive cohorts of individuals.  In analysing the period 1600-1800, for 
example, there is no reason why the average individual living in 1620-50 
should be valued more than the average individual living in 1720-50.  A 
second reason for not discounting is time inconsistency: those same young 
people who tend to heavily discount the future in retrospect regret what 
seemed like careless over-spending (van den Berg 2002). 
  Pair-wise GDP comparisons are usually misleading when Ireland is 
involved, since they ignore the significant (though now stabilising) gap 
between Irish GDP and GNP, due to transfer pricing and the repatriation of 
royalties and profits by foreign multinationals.  In mid-century this gap was 
insignificant but by the mid-1980s Irish GDP was only 90% of GNP, and 
today it is only 85%.  Thus while Irish GDP per head overtook Italian in 
1997/8 – the gap between Irish GNP per head and Italian GDP per had was 
not closed until 2001.8  Thus repeating the above calculation, but using 
Italian GDP per head and Irish GNP per head between 1950 and 2000 (when 
the latter overtook the former), yields a cumulative wedge one-fifth bigger 
than that using both Italian and Irish GDP per head. 
 
 
1.2. Demographic Considerations 
  6So far our focus has been on measures of output per head.  In 
assessing economic performance account should also be taken of extensive 
growth, i.e. allowance should be made for any major differences in the rates 
of population growth.  Economic historians tend to focus on measures of 
intensive growth such as GDP per head or the real wage; but surely the 
scale of extensive growth matters too.  Throughout most of history, 
maintaining living standards while population grew meant keeping the 
Malthusian wolf away from the door.  
In what follows, when comparing economic welfare and performance I 
shall simply add the rate of population growth to that in GDP per head.  An 
Economy A in which GDP per head doubles over a given period while 
population remains the same is deemed to perform as well as an Economy B 
where GDP per head fails to grow but population doubles.  In other words, 
this means comparing growth rates in real GDP. 
As Figure 2 shows, although the population growth rates in Ireland 
and Italy over the period as a whole were similar, short-term trends were 
very different.  In the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, the gaps in rates of 
population growth were considerable, with negative implications for Ireland’s 
relative economic performance.  The wedge between population-growth 
augmented GDPs was nearly ten times 1998 Irish GDP per head (as opposed 
to eight times when population is not taken into account). 
In assessing the two growth paths, the influence of improvements in 
life expectancy should also be factored in.  In 1950 Irish males stood to live 
1.4 years longer than their Italian peers, and Irish females 0.4 years longer.  
Half a century later the gap was reversed, with Italian males expected to 
  7outlive Irishmen by 1.2 years, and Italian females to outlive Irishwomen by 
1.9 years (see Figure 3).  Thus allowing for differences in the changes in the 
expectation of life at age zero, or e(0), between 1950 and 2000 would 
marginally increase Italy’s advantage.  The timing of the catch-up obviously 
matters.  Italian women overtook Irishwomen in the mid-1950s, while Italian 
men overtook Irishmen a decade or so later.  Here we work with the average. 
In ‘British mortality and the value of life’, Jeff Williamson, building on 
a classic paper by Dan Usher (1973), explained how to factor in increasing 
life expectancy in assessments of the economic performance of 
industrializing Britain.  Usher’s widely used measure reduces to the 
expression: 
 
GĈ = GC + (1/β).GL 
 
where GĈ  represents growth rate of Ĉ, the ‘true’ standard of living after 
taking the change in life expectancy into account, GC the growth rate of GDP 
per head, β the elasticity of utility with respect to GDP per head, and GL the 
change in life expectancy.  In this simple model the role of β is pivotal; in his 
study of Britain c. 1780-1930 Williamson worked with values of β = 0.25 to 
0.45.  An even simpler but serviceable way of dealing with the issue is that 
proposed by Lichtenberg (2003).9  He defines expected individual lifetime 
wellbeing (EILW) as YA.eA, where YA is average income and eA is expectation 
of life at birth in Economy A.  Relative EILW at a point in time then is 
measured as:  [YA.eA ]/[ YB.eB ].  This amounts to assuming that the marginal 
utility from additions to Y and e is constant.  In effect Lichtenberg’s measure 
  8of ‘true’ change implies β = 1, so it yields a lower return on improved life 
expectancy than the Usher-Williamson measure, which assumes β < 1.  
For Ireland-Italy, I compare U = ΣYi.ēi , where Yi is GDP per head in 
year i and ēi is life expectancy in year i relative to life expectancy in 1950.  
Figure 4 combines the data that produced Figures 1 and 3; it describes the 
gap between GDP per head (GAP) and GDP per head augmented by an index 
of life expectancy (GAP*).  For the purposes of Figure 4 the index is set at 
unity in 1950.  Adding up over the entire period, GAP* is 17.9% greater than 
GAP. 10  Here I follow Williamson and others in assuming that the 
improvements in life expectancy in this period were mainly due to 
exogenous factors such as improvements in medical technology and public 
health (Williamson 1984: 162-5).  Taking into account demographic factors 
just reinforces the point that the extra consumption that Italy gained by 




1.3. Did Inequality Matter? 
In Ireland the affluence of the recent past has not brought a reduction 
in income inequality.  To what extent might differences in income inequality 
trends in Ireland and Italy affect the above comparisons?  International 
comparisons of income distribution are a minefield (Atkinson and Brandolini 
2001).  Broadly comparable Irish and Italian data are available from the 
early 1970s on, however (Nolan and Smeeding 2004; Brandolini 2004).11  
Table 3 compares household level data from 1973 to 2000.  It suggests that 
  9income inequality in Italy was considerably greater in the 1970s than in 
Ireland, but that the gap closed quickly thereafter, and that by turn of the 
century inequality in Ireland was marginally greater.12
These data can be used to estimate an abbreviated social welfare 
index for each economy over the 1973-2000 period.  The social welfare index 
defined as WS = µ(1-G), where µ is mean income and G the Gini coefficient 
(Sen 1976).13  The ratios of resultant WS, and of Italian GDP per head to 
Irish GNP per head, are plotted in Figure 5.  They imply that Italy lost less 
ground to Ireland in ‘social welfare’ terms (as captured by WS) than in 
income terms between 1973 and 2000.  It bears noting, however, that both 
Ireland and Italy were characterised by high income inequality relative to 
other Western European countries throughout this period (e.g. Nolan and 
Smeeding 2004). 
 
Table 1. Ireland vs. Italy 1950-1998 
  IRELAND ITALY 
Year GDP  per  head 
(1990 intl $) 
Population 
(1,000s) 
GDP per head 
(1990 intl $) 
Population 
(1,000s) 
1950       3,446     2,969      3,502      47,105 
1973       6,867     3,073     10,643      54,751 
1990     11,825     3,506     16,320      56,719 
1998     18,183     3,705     17,759      57,592 




Table 2.  GDP per head and population: Italy and Ireland 
(annual growth rates) 
  GDP per head  Population  GDP 
Period  Italy Ireland Italy Ireland Italy Ireland 
1950-9  4.8 1.6 0.6 -0.4 5.4 1.2 
1960-9  4.8 3.5 0.6 0.3 5.4 3.8 
1970-9  2.7 3.0 0.5 1.3 3.2 4.3 
1980-9  2.0 2.4 0.0 0.3 2.0 2.7 
  101990-8  0.9 4.8 0.2 0.6 1.1 5.4 
1950-98  3.4 3.5 0.4 0.5 3.7 3.9 
 
 
Table 3. Gini Index for Ireland and Italy, 1973-2000 
Year  Italy Ireland 
1973 42 36.7 
1980 37 36.0 
1987 34.4 35.2 
1994/5 36.3  36.2 
2000 36.0 37.5 
 
Source: see text. 
 
 
Trends in the regional variation of incomes are also worth considering.  
In Italy the gap between richer and poorer regions was greater throughout 
than in Ireland.  The long-standing backwardness of the Mezzogiorno is an 
important factor here.14  In both economies there is evidence of considerable 
convergence between provinces or regions during the 1960s and 1970s, and 
of marking time in the 1980s and 1990s.  In Italy the coefficient of variation 
of regional GDP per head across Italy’s twenty provinces fell from 0.35 in the 
early 1960s to 0.27 in the late 1970s, but it was still 0.25 at the turn of the 
century.15  Data are available on gross value added per head in Irish regions 
since 1973, and on personal income or disposable income per head since 
1960.16  Throughout, not surprisingly, the regional variation in disposable 
income was less than that in value added.   
Let us define a pseudo-abbreviated social welfare function WR = µ(1-
CVR), where µ is mean income/output per head and CVR the coefficient of 
variation of regional income/output per head.  Figure 6 describes the two 
ratios of Italian to Irish WR (using both disposable income and value added 
  11measures of Irish CVR, respectively termed G(IRA) and G(IRB)) and of Italian 
GDP per head to Irish GNP per head between the 1960s and the present.  
Allowing for regional inequality makes Ireland look comparatively better 
throughout the period, but this outcome is the product of the different 
histories and geographies of the two economies.  More to the point, regional 
inequality decreased slightly more in Italy than in Ireland.  The ratio of 
Italian GDP to Irish GNP fell by 26% between 1960 and 2000, whereas the 
ratios of WR fell by 18% (using Irish personal/disposable income) and 23.4% 
(using Irish gross value added). 
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2.1. The Dutch Republic and Great Britain 
For much of the seventeenth century the most significant commercial 
and military rivalry in Europe was that between Great Britain and the Dutch 
Republic.  The rivalry resulted in a series of vicious, mainly naval wars 
between 1652 and 1684.  Although in the long run Britain’s beggar-my-
neighbour commercial policies prevailed over the Dutch, for decades 
travellers to Holland and those who formed British public opinion marvelled 
at Dutch ingenuity and success.  A well-informed contemporary, Sir William 
Temple, noted that the Dutch Republic’s ‘prodigious growth in Riches, 
Beauty, extent of Commerce, and number of Inhabitants’ had made it ‘the 
Envy of Some, the fear of others, and the Wonder of all their Neighbours’ 
  15(Temple 1673: Preface).  Political arithmetician Gregory King’s national 
accounts imply that by the end of the Golden Age the Dutch Republic was 
the richest economy in Europe (de Vries 1974: 242-3).  The population of 
Amsterdam, a city of thirty thousand souls in 1550, surged to 175,000 by 
1650, making it the fourth city in Europe by the latter date (after London, 
Paris, and Naples) (de Vries 1984: 271).   Historians such as Simon Schama 
and Jonathan Israel have celebrated Dutch ‘precocity’ and ‘primacy in world 
trade’ during the Golden Age (c. 1580-1670) (Schama 1987; Israel 1989).  
The ability of a small nation − the Netherlands contained only 1.5 million 
people in 1600, compared to Britain’s six million and France’s 18.5 million − 
to thrive on a thin natural resource base was the envy of its rivals.   
Three decades ago Jan de Vries described the economy of the Golden 
Age era as ‘high-level traditionalist’, which by the eighteenth century had 
sunk ‘into a complacent stagnation’.  Jan Luiten Van Zanden supports this 
assessment; he recently dubbed the growth of the Golden Age era ‘pre-
modern’ because it failed to generate significant gains in living standards 
and could not sustain itself in the long run.  Others, however, have stressed 
Dutch breakthroughs in the realms of agriculture, financial institutions, 
shipping, and public finance.  More recently, de Vries and Ad van der 
Woude have described the early modern Dutch economy as the first to 
experience ‘modern economic growth’ (de Vries 1976: 251, 252; Soltow and 
van Zanden 1998: 31; de Vries and van der Woude 1997; see too Goldstone 
2002).   
Either way, for all its earlier successes the Dutch economy was widely 
deemed a failure by the early nineteenth century.  Joel Mokyr in his 
  16pioneering comparative study of the Low Countries offers an overview of ‘the 
non-event of [Dutch] economic stagnation’ in the early nineteenth century 
(1976: 84).  Some historians link Dutch ‘failure’ relative to industrialising 
Britain or, indeed, to Belgium to its own earlier success. They blame the 
institutional sclerosis of a high wage economy encumbered by a generous 
social welfare regime, unable to cope with competition from poorer 
latecomers, especially Belgium and Great Britain (de Vries 1973; Mokyr 
1976; de Vries and van der Woude 1997; van Zanden 2002a, 2002b; van 
Zanden and van Riel 2004).  The historiography of the post-Golden Age 
economy is sombre in tone.  And according to Angus Maddison’s national 
account estimates (on which more below) Dutch GDP rose only by 7% 
between 1700 and 1820, while Belgium’s doubled and the United Kingdom’s 
more than trebled.  Over the same period, Dutch GDP per head fell. 
In the late seventeenth century Gregory King reckoned that Dutch 
national income exceeded that of England by ten to fifteen per cent. This gap 
is much less than that allowed by Angus Maddison, who implies that for 
over three centuries the Dutch enjoyed higher GDP per head than anywhere 
else, and that in 1700 Dutch GDP per head was 1.7 times the United 
Kingdom level (de Vries 1974: 242-3; Maddison 2000: Table B-21).  
Maddison’s data imply that the Dutch and British economies had roughly 
the same GDP per head c. 1500.  Then the Netherlands forged ahead of its 
great rival, only to lose ground from the late seventeenth-century on, and to 
be overtaken c. 1800.  This, and the sense that the Netherlands paid a price 
for being an ‘early starter’, suggests the case for taking a longer perspective 
  17in assessing the performance of the early modern Dutch economy, and for 
focusing on the period 1500-1800 or so as a whole.   
 
Table 4.  Estimates of Dutch GDP per head, 1500-1820 
Year  [1] Maddison  [2]Van Zanden  [2]/[1] 
c. 1500     761       1,252  1.65 
c. 1650  1,700       2,411  1.42 
c. 1700  2,100       2,386  1.14 
c. 1750  1,985       2,337  1.28 
1820  1,838       1,838  1.00 
Source: Maddison 2001 (for 1500, 1700, and 1820); van Zanden 
2001: Table 4.3; Maddison 2005: 25; my interpolations for 




In the present paper, I work with an amended version of Maddison’s 
estimates.  These imply that GDP per head in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom were roughly equal c. 1500, and again c. 1835.  In-
between, the Dutch built up a lead over the British that reached its peak in 
proportional terms in the 1690s; from then on the gap was slowly whittled 
away.  However, since the historiography is really about Anglo-Dutch 
rivalry, I have adjusted Maddison’s GDP per head data to exclude Ireland.  
The adjustment matters because Irish GDP per head was much less than 
British in this period -- I assume, arbitrarily, that Irish GDP per head was 
half British throughout -- and Irish population a significant proportion of 
the United Kingdom total, rising from about one-fifth c. 1500 to one-third c. 
1820 (Ó Gráda 1997b).   Figure 7 plots the trends in Dutch, United 
Kingdom, and British GDP per head between 1500 and the late 1840s, as 
inferred from Maddison’s data. 
  18Jan Luiten van Zanden’s reconstructions of Dutch GDP imply a very 
different trajectory before c. 1820.  Whereas Maddison’s numbers imply only 
a small Dutch advantage over the United Kingdom c. 1500, van Zanden’s 
imply a Dutch advantage of nearly three-fifths.  And while Maddison 
reckons that real GDP per head in the Netherlands rose by 140% between 
1500 and 1820, van Zanden’s best guess is that the rise was about one-
third that (Maddison 2001 Table B-21; van Zanden 2001; compare Federico 
2002).  The contrasting Maddison and van Zanden trajectories are 
summarized in Table 4.  Meanwhile Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude 
(1997: 709-710) refuse to ‘venture an estimate’ of the growth rate of the 
Dutch economy before the 1660s, but nonetheless they are confident that 
income per capita rose, pointing to significant productivity increases in 
agriculture, services, and shipping, the big rise in energy consumption in 
the previous two centuries or so.  It is enough to point out here that if Van 
Zanden’s estimate for 1500 is correct, then the Anglo-Dutch gap would have 
opened up earlier and all the following calculations will be underestimates of 
the gap. 
By Maddison’s reckoning Dutch GDP per head overtook British GDP 
per head in the mid-1510s and maintained its edge until mid-1790s.  How 
much was the extra Dutch output worth?  Between 1514/5 and 1794/5 the 
average gap was one-fifth of Dutch GDP per head.  Alternatively, adding 
together the annual gaps yields a wedge equivalent to 52 times 1795 GDP 
per head!  It would take a long time before faster British growth ‘recouped’ 
the accumulated Dutch advantage.  By 1850 only about 12% of the 
accumulated gap in annual GDPs per head had been ‘recouped’.  Six 
  19decades or so later, only three-fifths of the gap had been made up.  Since 
Britain’s population grew faster than Dutch over the period, allowing for 
differences in population growth attenuates the Dutch advantage somewhat, 
to 39 times 1795 GDP per head.  In Figure 8, the nl(*) schedule tracks 
Dutch GNP per head, weighted by an index that sets Dutch population 
relative to British in 1500 at unity.  Here the British subsequently ‘recoup’ 
more quickly, by 1858. 
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       Table 5.  Population and GDP per head, the Netherlands, France and Great Britain 
  Population (1,000)  GDP per head (1990 international $) 
Year      NL      GB        FR        NL       GB          FR 
  201500      950    3,142   15,000       754       795       727 
1600   1,500    5,700   18,500    1,368     1,060       841 
1700   1,900    6,640   21,471      2,110     1,408       986 
1820   2,355 14,139    31,246     1,821     2,048    1,230 





2.2. Allowing for urbanisation. 
The Dutch economy’s precocity was founded on the productivity of its 
agriculture and the strength of its commercial sector and its cities, but as 
Wrigley et al. (1997: 204) warn, ‘the severity of the urban penalty should not 
be underestimated’.  Figure 8 describes urbanisation rates (where ‘urban’ 
includes towns and cities of ten thousand or more) in the Netherlands, 
Great Britain, and France c. 1500-1900.  Dutch urbanisation rates, 
unparalleled in early modern Europe, imposed a toll in terms of morbidity 
and life expectancy.  Although it remains unclear whether the nutritional 
status of urban populations generally was inferior to that of their rural 
cousins, we know for sure that they suffered from congestion, poor 
sanitation, adulterated food, and endemic diseases (Riley 2001: 161-3).  
Urbanites everywhere were also smaller in stature.  Many rich citizens, 
aware of the increased mortality risk, left the cities for their rural retreats 
during the summer.  The poor did not have that choice. 
In 1673 England’s former ambassador at the Hague, Sir William 
Temple, described the Dutch ‘as generally not so long-liv’d as in better Airs; 
and begin to decay early, both men and women, especially in Amsterdam’.  
Temple singled out ‘Diseases of the Climate [which] all hot and dry 
  21Summers bring…that are infectious among them, especially into Amsterdam 
and Leyden’ (Temple 1673: 161).  Alas, in demographic terms, the pre-1800 
Netherlands remains somewhat of a ‘statistical dark age’.  How Amsterdam 
achieved its remarkable population growth in the century or so after 1580 
remains somewhat of a mystery.  The high proportions of widowed 
household heads in Dutch towns and cities and the Dutch obsession with 
cleanliness in the Golden Age era are consistent with the presumption that 
mortality was high in a congested, damp environment (van Strien 1993: 
212-3, 231n95; van de Woude 1972: 311-13; Schama 1987: 375-84).17  
However, hard evidence on immigration, on mortality, and the main causes 
of death are lacking.  Their absence has prompted some ‘controlled 
conjectures’ (de Vries 1985: 664; van der Woude 1983: 197-209; de Vries 
and van der Woude 1997; van Leeuwen and Oeppen 1997).   
An important contribution by George Alter reports life expectancies at 
birth of 25.3 years for the lives of nominees in the Amsterdam life annuities 
of 1586-90 and 30.0 years for those of 1672-74 (Alter 1983: 33).  The 
disappearance of plague was the main cause of the improvement between 
the two dates.18  Plainly, the social rank of the annuitants and their 
residence in Amsterdam are factors: these were prosperous people living in a 
port city. Although some claim that because infectious disease did not 
discriminate between rich and poor, mortality differed less by class in early 
modern Europe than later,19 evidence cited below suggests that Alter’s 
estimates should be taken very much as an upper bound of life expectancy 
in the Netherlands at the time.  The low life expectancies yielded by the 
trickle of evidence from local studies are corroborative.  Dirk Noordam, for 
  22instance, reports a strikingly low life expectancy of 26.5 years in the 
Maasland region (south Netherlands) in 1730-59, while Richard Paping 
found life expectancies of just over thirty years in five Catholic populations 
living in the northern clay lands around Groningen in 1731-70 (Noordam 
1986; Paping 1988). 
 
The paucity of Dutch data means that the evidence from urban 
communities in neighbouring countries is also worth considering.  Data 
from England, reported in Tables 6 and 7 below, imply that the urban 
penalty in terms of life expectancy must have been substantial before 1800 
(Woods 2001; see too Szreter and Mooney 1998).  The shifting rural 
premium in London is of particular interest.  Table 7 implies a huge gap 
between the average life span in London and in England as a whole in the 
early eighteenth century.20  Thereafter the gap dwindled almost without 
interruption (though at an accelerating rate towards the end of the 
nineteenth century).   
Presumably social class affected mortality too.  It is also interesting to 
compare life expectancy of Londoners in general with that of London 
Quakers, a largely middle-class group.  The average Quaker might expect to 
live 28.8 years in 1650-99, 24 years in 1700-49, 29.8 years in 1750-99, and 
35.5 years in 1800-49 (Landers 1993: 158).  This implies a gap of 6-7 years 
between the Quakers and the population of London as a whole in the 
eighteenth century, although London Quakers still died younger than rural 
Englishmen and Englishwomen.  Alfred Perrenoud’s findings for 
seventeenth-century Geneva reveal just as steep a class gradient as in 
  23London.  In 1650-84, the life expectancy of Genevan workers, male and 
female together, was 20.5 years; that of the middle class was 26.0 years, 
and that of the elite 36.8 years (cited in de Vries 1984: 184; see Perrenoud 
1975).21  In the light of such data, Alter’s estimates for Amsterdam 
annuitants’ middle-class nominees entail very short lives indeed for the 
inhabitants of Amsterdam.  A six-year gap between the middle-class and the 
population as a whole would indicate life expectancies in the cities of less 
than twenty years in the 1580s and 23-25 years in the 1670s.  
Given the high rate of Dutch urbanization at a time when the urban 
mortality disadvantage was very striking indeed, it is surely not farfetched to 
assume that urbanization reduced the average lifespan in the Netherlands 
by an average of three years below British levels during the longue durée 
analyzed here.  In Table 8 I report the implications of factoring in the value 
of life for β = 0.45 and β = 1.  Even β = 1 reduces the cumulative gains built 
up between 1515 and 1795 considerably; assuming β = 0.45 erodes all the 





Table 6.  e(0)  in England and Wales 
Decade  London  Large towns  Small towns  Rural 
1751-60    20.1      ---      27.5    41.3 
1801-10    35.0    32.0      34.2    42.2 
1821-30    36.9    32.7      36.2    43.3 
1841-50    36.7    32.0      36.0    43.5 
1861-70    37.7    33.0      38.0    46.5 
1881-80    42.6    39.0      44.0    51.0 
  241901-10    49.4    46.3      50.5    56.5 
  




Table 7.  Life expectancy in London and in England & Wales, 1700s-1860s 
Decade  [1] E&W  [2] London  [1]-[2] 
1700s  38.5  18.5    20.0 
1730s  31.8  18.2    13.6 
1740s  33.5  17.6    15.9 
1750s  37.0  20.1    16.9 
1760s  34.6  20.5    13.9 
1770s  36.9  21.6    15.3 
1780s  35.3  25.5      9.8 
1790s  37.1  27.5      9.6 
1800s  37.2  28.0      9.2 
1810s  37.8  32.4      5.4 
1820s  39.6  34.4      5.2 
1830s  40.5  36.9      3.6 
1840s  40.0  36.7      3.3 
1850s  40.0  38.0      2.0 
1860s  40.8  37.7      3.1 
     
Sources:  
London 1730s-1820s: Landers 2000: 171 
London 1700s, 1830s-1860s: Woods 2000: 365 

















1500 1600 1700 1800 1900
FR NL E&W
 
Source: de Vries 1984: 39, 45-46. 
 
 
Table 8. The Wedge in ‘True’ Living Standards (in multiples of 1795 British 
GDP per head) 
  GDP per head  ‘True’ measure 
β = 1 
‘True’ measure 
β = 0.45 
Gap relative to 
1795 GDP per 
head 
52 34 10 
Allowing for 
extensive growth 





  The two comparisons described above prompt two concluding 
thoughts.  First, economic historians tend to have less time than their 
colleagues in political and military history for past heroics or even for past 
  26genius.  They are used to their entrepreneurs being replaceable, to social 
savings being ‘small’, and to economic growth during the Industrial 
Revolution being ‘modest’.  Their answers to ‘how big is big?’ are conditioned 
by a belief in Harberger triangles and a confidence that inputs, both animate 
and inanimate, are highly substitutable.  Against such a historiographical 
tradition, the ‘savings’ or ‘costs’ of the alternative routes described in this 
paper are very significant.  When the Irish route to the present is evaluated 
against the Italian, the cost of policy ‘failures’ in the 1950s and 1970s was 
indeed ‘big’22; just as the benefits of Dutch economic precociousness in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even when set against later 
retardation, were considerable. 
  Second, the very present-centred focus on the Irish economy in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s has led many observers to believe that the Irish 
had somehow discovered secrets to rapid economic growth which were 
readily transferable elsewhere.  Yet much of the post-1987 growth was of the 
catch-up kind, compensation for decades of underperformance.  As for 
Dutch retardation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it 






  27APPENDIX 1.  DUTCH AND ENGLISH WAGES 
In the debate about incomes in the early modern Netherlands and 
Britain, wage data only muddy the waters further.  Recent estimates by Bob 
Allen (2001), shown in Figure A1, suggest that building labourers (BL) and 
building craftsmen (BC) in London (L, representing England) were better 
paid than their counterparts in Amsterdam (A, representing the 
Netherlands) in the first half of the sixteenth century, but that they lost 
their lead thereafter and did not regain it for a century or more.  Allen’s data 
also suggest that real wages in Amsterdam were about one-fifth higher in 
1750-99 than they had been in 1550-49, while in London they were about 
the same in both periods.  Meticulous research by John Munro (2001), from 
which Table A1 below is taken, corroborates Allen’s findings for the early 
sixteenth century.  It reveals that wage earners in England c. 1500 had the 
edge over wage earners in the Antwerp region – generally conceded to be as 
economically advanced as Holland at this time – but that they lost it during 
the following few decades.  Such data are not so readily squared with van 
Zanden’s claim that Dutch GDP per head was 1.58 times British c. 1500, 
nor with the assertion that ‘real wages declined a lot between 1500 and 
1800’ (van Zanden 2001; 2002: 154); but they are not so easily reconciled 
either with the almost three-fold rise in GDP per head indicated by 
Maddison over the same period.  Van Zanden concedes that English GDP 
per head in 1650 was unlikely to be ‘only about half the Dutch level’ (2001: 
78-9). 
 














1500 1550 1600 1650 1700
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BL(L) BL(A) BC(L) BC(A)
1750 1800 1850
 
Source: Allen 2001 
 
 
Table A1. Wages in Southern England and Belgium c. 1500-1540 
Item (Quantity per 
daily wage) 
England 1501-05  Antwerp 1501-05  Ratio (England/Antwerp) 
Wine (litres)    3.47    2.92  1.19 
Herrings (no.)  43.32  48.45  0.89 
Peas (litres)  40.27  19.70  2.05 
Wheat (litres)  22.25  19.84  1.12 
Sugar (kilos)    0.94    1.02  0.92 
    
Item (Quantity per 
daily wage) 
England 1536-40  Antwerp 1536-40  Ratio (England/Antwerp) 
Wine (litres)   2.64   3.49  0.76 
Herrings (no.)  38.17  45.48  0.84 
Peas (litres)  30.50  21.38  1.43 
Wheat (litres)  21.90  17.15  1.28 
Sugar (kilos)    0.39   0.74  0.52 
Source: Munro (2001: Table 16) 
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1 Earlier versions were given at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Queen’s University Belfast.  My 
thanks to Andrea Brandolini, Kevin Denny, Gianfranco di Viao, Michael Edelstein, David 
Madden, Brian Nolan, and Brendan Walsh for sharing data and for comments. 
2 Survey data generally refer only to the recent past; see, however, the Subjective 
Impoverishment Index discussed in Mokyr and Ó Gráda 1988, which refer to data from the 
1830s. While Tim Leunig and Joachim Voth have recently commented on ‘the fading use of 
stature’ as indicators of movements in health and wellbeing in advanced industrial societies, 
much is expected of the anthropometric approach in assessments of health and nutritional status 
in the pre-documented past, such as in medieval Europe and pre-Columban America (Leunig 
and Voth 2002; Steckel 2002; Steckel and Rose 2002).   
3 The sorpasso emerged when the Italian statistical service revised its estimate of the black 
economy upward. 
4  For an account of the Irish economy before the boom see Ó Gráda 1997a. 
5 In mid-century the Italian economy was sixteen times the size of Ireland’s. 
6 Italy had been worse affected by World War II than neutral Ireland, and its recovery between 
1945 and 1950 – spurred on by the Marshall Plan – was accordingly faster.  However, by mid-
century the rates of growth in both economies had declined to levels sustained in the following 
decade.   
7 For an excellent overview of the Italian economy between 1945 and the mid-1990s see Rossi 
and Toniolo (1996). 
8 Between 1998 and 2001 Italian GDP per head grew by 6% whereas Irish GDP per head grew 
by 27%. 
9 For more recent applied work on this topic compare Nordhaus (2002) and Becker et al. (2003).   
10 In partial mitigation, over the half-century the number of hours worked per employee in 
Ireland dropped more than in Italy: by 25.8% versus 18.9% (compare Gordon 2004). 
  35                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 An earlier estimate for urban Ireland can be inferred from data on gross weekly household 
incomes in Irish cities and towns in 1965-66 (as reported in Geary 1977: 172-5).  It implies a G 
of 0.345, but is not readily comparable to our later estimates. 
12 I owe the 2000 Irish estimate to Brian Nolan, who estimated it from the Household Budget 
Survey.  
13 The following exercise implicitly assumes that both economies ‘care’ equally about inequality.   
14 The problems of the Italian South, or Mezzogiorno, have been the focus of a huge literature 
from a variety of disciplines. For nuanced studies of the Mezzogiorno in the 1990s, with some 
background on earlier trends, see Barca (2001) and di Vaio (2004). 
15 Calculations based on weighted standard deviations yield broadly similar results.  
16 Both Irish measures involve splicing data and shifts in definition.  The income data splices two 
series.  (i) The 1960-77 estimates refer to estimates of personal income (which includes 
transfers).  These are mainly the work of Micheál Ross, and were originally published by NESC 
(see National Economic and Social Council 1980). (ii) The 1980-1994 data are taken from Boyle 
et al. (1999), and the 2000 figure derived from Central Statistics Office estimates of disposable 
income by county 
(http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/economy/2001/regincome_2001.pdf).   
The gross value added series combines that of O’Leary (2004) for 1960-1996 with CSO data for 
2000, adjusted downward from 0.213 to 0.177 to allow for the effect of transfer pricing.  This 
reflects the gap between O’Leary’s estimate for 1996 (0.156) and the uncorrected CSO data 
(0.188).  I assume that the coefficients of variation changed at a constant rate in years between 
observations. 
17 De Vries (1995: 669) notes that in the 1730s Amsterdam parish registers recorded an annual 
average of 3,300 girls born; twenty-five years later, an annual average of 1,410 Amsterdam-born 
women were wed.  The ratio seems to imply high mortality, but this makes no allowance for the 
relative importance of inward and outward migration, celibacy, and the likely under-registration 
of births. 
18 These are Alter’s ‘non-select’ estimates, which exclude the first years of each annuity in order 
to minimize selection bias.  In Amsterdam in 1636 the plague killed over seventeen thousand 
people, or one-seventh of the population; in Leiden and in Haarlem too it killed significant 
proportions of the inhabitants. 
19 The estimates of life expectancy yielded by van Leeuwen and Oeppen’s Generalised Inverse 
Projection modeling are generally higher than those derived from annuities between the 1670s 
and 1720s; I do not invoke them here for that reason.   
  36                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 Death-by-age data for London as a whole become available only in the early eighteenth 
century.    
21 Life expectancy in Geneva grew roughly in tandem with London: from 23.9 years in 1625-49 
to 34.3 years a century later and 39.9 years in 1800-1820 (ADH 1978: 223). 
22 In a rather different vein Robert Lucas has famously argued, referring to economic growth in 
the developed world in recent decades, that the gap between a growth path associated with ‘real’ 
business cycles one which succeeded in eliminating the cycles was small, in the sense that society 
should have been prepared to pay only a small fraction of output in order to eliminate 
fluctuations (Lucas 2004). 
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